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Abstract
We report an intriguing empirical observation. The relationship between corruption
and output depends on the economy’s degree of openness: in open economies, corrup-
tion and GNP per capita are strongly negatively correlated, but in closed economies
there is no relationship at all. This stylized fact is robust to a variety of diﬀerent em-
pirical speciﬁcations. In particular, the same basic pattern persists if we use alternative
measures of openness, if we focus on diﬀerent time periods, if we restrict the sample
to include only highly corrupt countries, if we restrict attention to speciﬁc geographic
areas or to poor countries, and if we allow for the possible endogeneity of the corrup-
tion measure. We ﬁnd that the extent to which corruption aﬀects output is determined
primarily by the degree of ﬁnancial openness. The diﬀerence between closed and open
economies is mainly due to the diﬀerent eﬀect of corruption on capital accumulation.
We present a model, consistent with these ﬁndings, in which the main channel through
w h i c hc o r r u p t i o na ﬀects output is capital drain.
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Economists, historians, and political scientists have long been engaged in a debate as to
whether, and to what extent, corruption harms economic growth. The prevailing view is that
corruption disrupts economic activity by distorting the eﬃcient allocation of resources in the
economy. Perhaps surprisingly, some have argued that, by ‘oiling the wheels’ of bureaucracy,
corruption can also sometimes be beneﬁcial for the economy (Huntington, 1968; Lui, 1985).1
In an important recent contribution to this debate, Mauro (1995) constructed a cor-
ruption index for 67 countries, and showed that corruption is indeed negatively associated
with investment and growth. Mauro also argued that the direction of causality is from cor-
ruption to development, rather than vice-versa.2 A number of theoretical studies point to
several channels through which corruption may adversely aﬀect income, but as of yet, these
theoretical investigations, although suggestive, lack an empirical basis.3
This paper contributes to the literature on corruption by reporting an intriguing stylized
fact which seems to have escaped the attention of researchers. We ﬁnd that the relation-
ship between corruption and output per capita is strongly related to a country’s degree of
openness. Figure 1 presents a scatter plot of log GDP per capita in the 1996-2003 period on
an index of corruption for open countries (top panel) and closed countries (bottom panel).4
It is immediately apparent that output per capita is strongly negatively correlated with
corruption in open economies (Figure 1a). The relationship between corruption and output
per capita among closed economies is more complex: ﬁrst, the scatter plot has a cloud-like
shape, with two countries that stand out as outliers, Estonia and the Democratic Republic
of the Congo (formerly Zaire). Second, a closer look at the ﬁgure reveals that the points on
the scatter plot are clustered by continents: European countries are mostly located in the
top left corner of the graph, African countries are located in the bottom right corner, and
Asian countries are somewhere in the middle. The negative relationship between output and
corruption thus masks what is essentially a continent eﬀect. In the empirical section of the
paper we show that, controlling for continent dummies, the relationship between corruption
1By contrast, Tanzi (1998) and Guriev (2004) claim that corruption can generate an excessive amount of
red tape.
2Mauro’s ﬁndings have been conﬁrmed in recent work by Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi (1999). These
ﬁndings are consistent with those of Hall and Jones (1999) and La Porta et al. (1999).
3See, e.g., the recent surveys by Bardhan (1997), Jain (2001), and Aidt (2003), and the references therein.
4The corruption index is taken from Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi (2003). Countries are classiﬁed
as open or closed based on the Wacziarg and Welch (2003) openness index. A detailed description of the
sources and the data appears in Section 2 below.
1and output disappears in closed countries, while it persists in open ones. To strengthen this
point, we look at the relationship between corruption and output separately by continents,
and ﬁnd the same basic pattern: in closed economies — no relationship, in open economies —
a strong negative relationship.
A possible explanation for the diﬀerence in the corruption-output relationship between
open and closed economies is that the sample of closed countries is made up primarily of poor
and highly corrupt economies. We check this hypothesis by restricting attention to Africa
or Asia alone, to non-OECD countries, and to countries with a high level of corruption. All
these diﬀerent sample restrictions strongly indicate that the diﬀerence between open and
closed economies does not stem from the fact that closed economies are on average poorer
and more corrupt. Similarly, one may argue that corruption is measured imprecisely in poor
economies: hence, it will be diﬃcult to detect any correlation between output and corruption
simply because of attenuation bias. This is not the case: even when we restrict the sample
to countries where corruption is measured with high variability we ﬁn das t r o n gp o s i t i v e
correlation in the open economies, and no correlation in the closed economies. Finally, we
experiment with a variety of diﬀerent empirical speciﬁcations to assess the robustness of
our ﬁndings. The same basic pattern persists if we focus on diﬀerent time periods, if we
add controls for size, population, latitude, and religion, and if we allow for the possible
endogeneity of the corruption measure.
In order to identify the possible causes of this empirical observation we decompose in-
come to gauge whether the reported pattern of results is attributable to physical capital, to
human capital, or to total factor productivity (TFP).5 We ﬁnd that the results are robust
with respect to the replacement of income by physical capital but not with respect to the
replacement of income by TFP. That is, while corruption seems to aﬀect the level of physical
capital only in open economies, its eﬀect on TFP is unrelated to the economy’s degree of
openness. Interestingly, when openness is measured either by the volume of trade or by the
level of barriers to trade, there is no distinction between open and closed countries in the
corruption-output relationship. Only when openness is measured by the black market pre-
m i u m ,ap r o x yf o rf r e ec a p i t a lm o v e m e n t s ,d ow eﬁnd that the negative correlation between
corruption and output is limited to open economies.
We present a simple neoclassical growth model with endogenous corruption that is consis-
tent with the three key stylized facts that emerge from the empirical analysis: (1) corruption
is negatively correlated with output in open economies, but not in closed economies; (2)
5See also Caselli (2004) for an in-depth review of “income accounting.”
2the diﬀerence between closed and open economies is mainly due to the diﬀerent eﬀect of
corruption on capital accumulation in closed and open economies, respectively; and (3) the
e x t e n tt ow h i c hc o r r u p t i o na ﬀects output is determined primarily by the degree of ﬁnancial,
rather than trade, openness.
In the model, state oﬃcials may steal part of tax revenues which the government uses
to ﬁnance the provision of a public good. An oﬃcial that is caught stealing loses his job
and with it his wage, which is higher in richer countries. Consequently, in richer countries
where public sector wages are higher, oﬃcials are less inclined to steal and corruption is
lower.6 Since corrupt oﬃcials have an incentive to transfer the proceeds of their illegal
activities abroad, corruption depletes the country’s capital stock, and slows down economic
development. Hence, depending on initial conditions, an economy can either converge to a
steady state equilibrium with high wealth and low corruption, or to a steady state equilibrium
with low wealth and high corruption. Poor economies are trapped in a vicious circle in which
high levels of corruption lead to low output, which generates yet more corruption, and so
on.
Our results suggest that an important channel through which corruption impedes eco-
nomic development is the transfer of illegally obtained capital abroad. Indeed it is estimated
that the citizens of some African and Latin American countries hold more ﬁnancial assets
abroad than the entire capital stock in their country (Pastor, 1990; Boyce and Ndikumana
2001). In economies with lower barriers to capital movement, it is easier to transfer illegal
graft money abroad. In ﬁnancially closed economies, illegally obtained capital is more likely
to stay within the country. In other words, in open economies corruption aﬀe c t si n c o m eb y
inducing “capital drain.” 7 In contrast, in closed economies the adverse eﬀect of corruption
on output is mitigated because capital drain plays a less important role.
Whether administrative barriers prevent capital ﬂight is related to how the proceeds of
corruption are distributed across the ranks of the civil service. In this context, we can think of
three classes of civil servants. At the low end there are oﬃcials who receive petty bribes and
do not amass large sums of money, and are therefore unlikely to transfer funds abroad, even
in the absence of barriers to capital transfers.8 A tt h eo p p o s i t ee n do ft h es p e c t r u m ,w eﬁnd
6This assumption is supported by Van Rijckeghem and Weder (2001) who ﬁnd in a sample of low-income
countries that the relative pay of civil-servants is negatively associated with corruption.
7We use the term capital drain to desginate the legal transfer of (legally and ilegally obtained) capital. We
distinguish between capital drain and capital ﬂight which designates the illegal transfer of (possibly legally
obtained) capital.
8See Hunt and Laszlo (2005) for evidence on the pervasiveness of bribes paid by households in Peru.
3the highest political echelon, for whom barriers to capital ﬂows are irrelevant or ineﬀective
(the late Mobutu of Zaire and Somosa of Nicaragua are infamous examples of rulers who
stashed substantial portions of their countries’ wealth abroad). It is in the middle strata
of the bureaucracy where restrictions to capital ﬂows are most eﬀective. On the one hand,
these bureaucrats accumulate large enough sums and are sophisticated enough to facilitate
transfer of money abroad. On the other hand, they are not inﬂuential enough to overcome
freely restrictions on capital exports. These bureaucrats will transfer more funds abroad,
the lower the administrative barriers.
Finally, it is important to emphasize that our results should not be interpreted to imply
that openness is detrimental to development. To the contrary: our empirical ﬁndings indicate
that for the majority of countries openness is indeed beneﬁcial for output; only in the most
corrupt economies do we ﬁnd that openness has a negative eﬀect on GDP per capita. Since
the most corrupt economies are also the poorest, it follows that openness may be harmful
in those economies.9 This conclusion is corroborated by the ﬁndings of Wacziarg and Welch
(2003) who showed that openness had beneﬁcial eﬀects in the 1980s but not in the 1990s,
when a large number of relatively poor countries opened up.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. In the next section, we describe the data we
used and the robustness tests we performed. In Section 3 we explore the channels through
which corruption may adversely aﬀect output in open economies, but not in closed ones. In
Section 4 we present a simple theoretical model that is consistent with our basic empirical
ﬁndings. Section 5 oﬀers concluding remarks.
2D a t a a n d R e s u l t s
2.1 Data Description
Our main measure of economic development is the 1996-2003 average of GDP per capita in
current U.S. dollars evaluated at purchasing power parity, and is taken from the 2004 World
Bank Development Index Online. Altogether, GDP per capita is available for 173 countries
and dependencies.
As our measure of corruption we use the newly created data set of Kaufmann, Kraay
9This observation is consistent with the recent critique of Rodriguez and Rodrik (2001) of the empirical
literature on openness and growth. Our analysis suggests that while openness may indeed be beneﬁcial
for rich countries where corruption tends to be low, it may not be the case for very poor countries where
corruption is usually much higher.
4and Mastruzzi (2003, henceforth KKM). KKM use a variety of indicators collected by
international organizations, political and business rating agencies, think tanks, and non-
governmental organizations to construct six broad aggregates that measure governance from
1996 to 2002. One of these aggregates, which KKM refer to as “Control of Corruption,”
measures perceptions of corruption. The deﬁnition of corruption is the conventional one:
the exercise of public power for private gain. The various sources used by KKM examine
diﬀerent aspects of corruption, ranging from “corruption of public oﬃcials,” “eﬀectiveness
of anticorruption initiatives,” “corruption as an obstacle to business,” “frequency of ‘addi-
tional payments’ to ‘get things done,’ ” “mentality regarding corruption,” and the “eﬀect
of corruption on the attractiveness of a country as a place to do business.” We take as our
basic measure of corruption the average of the index in 1996, 1998, and 2000, so that our
corruption measure roughly predates our measure of income. The KKM index in each year is
standardized so as to have mean zero and standard deviation one in the sample. High values
of the index represent good governance, that is, low corruption. We multiply the index by -1
so that, consistent with our terminology throughout the paper, countries with a high value
of the corruption variable are indeed more corrupt. Overall, the corruption index is available
for 185 countries.
We classify countries based on their openness status in the 1990s using the newly created
data set of Wacziarg and Welch (2003, henceforth WW). WW extend the Sachs-Warner
(1995) index of openness to the 1990s, and also expand the list of countries for which the
index is available to include the economies of Central and Eastern Europe and the newly
independent states of the former Soviet Union. Countries are classiﬁed as open if they satisfy
all the following ﬁve criteria: (1) the average of unweighted tariﬀs in the 1990-1999 period is
lower than 40%; (2) the average of core non-tariﬀ barriers on capital goods and intermediates
is lower than 40%; (3) the average black market premium over the period is lower than 20%;
(4) the country does not have an export marketing board; and (5) the country is not socialist.
Note that some of the openness criteria capture the extent to which the country is open with
respect to trade of physical goods, while others, such as the black market premium, are
more closely related to the degree of openness of ﬁnancial markets. Altogether, the openness
status is available for 141 countries. The variables and their sources are summarized in Table
1.
W et h u se n du pw i t has a m p l eo f1 3 4c o u n t r i e sf o rw h i c hd a t ai sa v a i l a b l eo nG D Pp e r
capita, corruption, and openness. The list of countries, classiﬁed by their openness status
and their degree of corruption is presented in Table 2. As can be seen, all closed countries,
5with the exception of Estonia, are characterized by at least a medium degree of corruption.
On the other hand, open economies exhibit a wide range of corruption levels. Most OECD
countries are open and are characterized by low corruption. Interestingly, corruption and the
lack thereof do not seem to be conﬁned to any particular geographic region. Countries with
low levels of corruption can be found in Sub-Saharan Africa (Botswana), Central America
(Costa Rica, Trinidad and Tobago), East Asia (Hong Kong, Malaysia, Singapore, Taiwan)
and among the transition economies of Central and Eastern Europe (Slovenia, Hungary).
At the same time, these regions also have worthy representatives among the list of highly
corrupt countries. Summary statistics for all of our variables are presented in Table 3.
2.2 Methodology
We proceed to test whether the simple relationship that is documented in Figure 1 is robust
to a variety of diﬀerent speciﬁcations and estimation techniques. We have a continuous
measure of corruption and a binary indicator of openness, that takes on the value of 1 for
open countries, and zero for closed countries. We are interested in testing whether the
coeﬃcient on the corruption variable in closed economies is signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero,
and whether there is a signiﬁcant diﬀerence in the corruption-output relationship between
closed and open countries. To do this, we pool all countries together, and estimate the
following regression equation:





5Continenti × OPENi + εi,
where GDPi is GDP per capita in country i,Continenti is a vector of dummy variables
indicating continents, and εi is an error term that captures measurement errors and unob-
served determinants of output. This regression implies that for closed countries, the equation
becomes
lnGDPi = β0 + β1CORRUPTIONi + β
0
4Continenti + εi,
whereas for open countries the relationship is
lnGDPi =( β0 + β2)+( β1 + β3)CORRUPTIONi +( β4 + β5)
0 Continenti + εi.
We hypothesize that β1 should be indistinguishable from zero, while (β1 + β3) should be
negative and signiﬁcant. We estimate the equation with and without the continent dummies.
6These are included to capture fundamental diﬀerences in levels of output and corruption
across diﬀerent geographic regions that may drive the overall relationship between the two
variables. We elaborate further on this point in the next section.
Several points in our econometric speciﬁcation deserve special comment. First, note that
we focus our attention on levels of income per capita rather than growth rates. This follows
the recent works of Hall and Jones (1999) and KKM. The standard justiﬁcation that is
provided for this approach stems from the observation that it is levels, rather than growth
rates, that capture fundamental cross-country diﬀerences in consumption, and hence also in
welfare levels. In addition, the theoretical literature on growth predicts that in the long run
all countries should grow at the same rate, so that cross-country diﬀerences in growth are by
their nature transitory (Mankiw, Romer, and Weil, 1992; Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 1992).
This prediction is conﬁrmed by the ﬁnding in Easterly et al. (1993), who ﬁnd that growth
rates are weakly correlated across decades.10
Second, one may wonder whether our parsimonious approach is correct, and whether
we should not include other determinants of output on the right hand side of equation (1).
We take the view that equation (1) is a true long run relationship, and therefore it makes
little sense to control for variables (such as stocks of physical and human capital, the size of
government, the rate of inﬂation, etc.) that are themselves the endogenous outcomes of the
process of economic development (e.g., Hall and Jones, 1999; Laporta et al., 1999).
2.3 OLS Results
In Table 4 we present simple OLS estimates of equation (1). Recall that the eﬀect of
c o r r u p t i o no no u t p u ti nc l o s e de c o n o m i e si sg i v e nb yt h ec o e ﬃcient on corruption alone,
while in open economies we must look at the sum of the coeﬃcients on corruption and on
the corruption-openness interaction. In each column of the table we report the F statistic
which tests for the signiﬁcance of this sum, and its corresponding p-value: high values of the
F statistic indicate that we can reject the null hypothesis that corruption has no eﬀect on
output in open economies.
Column (1) of Table 4 presents the estimation results for the basic speciﬁcation without
continent dummies. Corruption is strongly negatively associated with output in both closed
10In fact, we also estimated a version of the model in which the dependent variable is the country’s growth
rate between 1980 and 2003, using Mauro’s (1995) index of corruption and Sachs and Warner’s openness
index for the 1980s. We did not ﬁnd any relationship between corruption and growth in either open or closed
countries.
7and open economies. Notice that, contrary to conventional wisdom, in this speciﬁcation
openness on its own is unrelated to output. However, when we add continent dummies in
column (2), the results diﬀer markedly. Adding the continent dummies increases signiﬁcantly
the explanatory power of the model, with the R2 increasing from 0.69 to 0.83.11 Importantly,
in this scpeciﬁcation the relationship between corruption and output in closed economies
b e c o m e sm u c hw e a k e r :t h ec o e ﬃcient on the corruption variable drops from -0.96 to -0.28,
with a t-statistic of -1.22. By contrast, corruption and output continue to be strongly
n e g a t i v e l yc o r r e l a t e di no p e nc o u n t r i e s :t h ed i ﬀerence between open and closed economies
is statistically signiﬁcant (t-statistic of -2.22), the implied coeﬃc i e n to nc o r r u p t i o ni no p e n
c o u n t r i e si s- 0 . 8 0 ,a n dw es t r o n g l yr e j e c tt h en ull of no relationship between corruption and
output (F-statistic = 251). Notice that in this speciﬁcation openness is strongly associated
with income.
Why are the results so diﬀerent between columns (1) and (2)? The answer lies in Figure
1b, which represents a textbook example of the importance of controls for omitted variables.
In closed economies, ignoring geographic diﬀerences, there appears to be a negative relation-
ship between corruption and output. However, this negative relationship hides fundamental
diﬀerences across continents. European countries enjoy on average higher levels of output
and are less corrupt, African countries are much poorer and signiﬁcantly more corrupt, while
Asian countries are somewhere in between. If continent dummies are excluded, the regres-
sion line goes through these three blocks of countries, generating the negative relationship
observed in column (1). It is suﬃcient to take into account the diﬀerences in levels of GDP
and corruption between the continents to make the relationship for closed countries all but
vanish. That is not the case among open countries, where, even after controlling for continent
dummies, we strongly reject the null hypothesis of no relationship.
W h i c hi st h e nt h er i g h ts p e c i ﬁcation? If we attach a causal meaning to our estimates,
the results in column (1) imply that a reduction in corruption raises output, regardless of
any potential third factors that aﬀect both variables. The results in column (2) demonstrate
that among closed countries, taking into account diﬀerences between continents, a reduction
in corruption would not be associated with an increase in output. To strengthen this point,
we ask whether there are signiﬁcant diﬀerences in the corruption-output relationship within
continents: if the connection between corruption and output is independent of regional,
cultural and other diﬀerences between continents (as implied by the results of column 1),
11The F-statistic for the joint signiﬁcance of the continent dummies and their interaction with the openness
indicator is equal to 15.95 (p-value = 0.000). It also should be noted that the continent dummies interacted
with the openness indicator are also jointly signiﬁcant, with F-statistic equal to 10.31 (p-value = 0.000).
8then we would expect to ﬁnd a signiﬁcant corruption coeﬃcient in both open and closed
economies. In columns (3) to (5), we estimate equation (1) separately for Africa, Asia and
Europe.12 In both Asia and Africa (columns 3 and 4), there is virtually no relationship
between corruption and output in closed economies, and a signiﬁcant negative relationship
in open economies. For Europe, on the other hand, output and corruption are negatively
linked in both open and closed economies (column 5). From now on, all our speciﬁcations
will include continent dummies.
It could be argued that the diﬀerences that we found between open and closed economies
stem from the fact that closed economies are on average poorer and more corrupt than open
economies. We cannot directly condition on the level of GDP per capita, since sample selec-
tion on the basis of the dependent variable biases the regression coeﬃcients. In particular,
it is not diﬃcult to show that restricting the sample to poor countries would result in an
upward bias in the corruption coeﬃcient (i.e., we would biased towards ﬁn d i n gn oc o r r e l a t i o n
even if in fact the correlation is negative). However, looking separately at Africa (column
4) already alleviates much of the concern, since the poorest third of the sample is made up
mainly of African countries, and nearly all African countries belong to this group. A similar
argument can be made for Asia. We further probe into this point by restricting attention
to only non-OECD countries, (column 6), and to only highly corrupt countries (those with
a corruption index greater than zero, column 7). In both cases we ﬁnd that the results
of column (2) are virtually unchanged: corruption is uncorrelated with output in closed
economies; by contrast, even among non-OECD or highly corrupt economies that are open,
the correlation between corruption and output is negative and highly signiﬁcant.
Finally, it could be that the diﬀerence between open and closed economies stems from the
fact that closed economies are poorer and hence corruption is measured less accurately. If
that is the case, the argument goes, the diﬀerence is due to the diﬀerent extent of attenuation
bias between open and closed economies. Fortunately, we can test this claim: KKM provide,
for each index of governance and for every country and year, the standard error of the index,
which they interpret as a measure of precision or reliability. For each country, we average
the standard errors of the corruption index in 1996, 1998 and 2000, and we take this average
as our index of noisiness. We then rerun our basic regression of column (2) using only the
countries in the top third of the distribution of the noisiness index. The results are reported
in column (8). Again, we ﬁnd no eﬀect of corruption in closed countries, and a signiﬁcant
12There is only a single closed economy in both North and South America, making it impossible to estimate
the equation.
9negative eﬀe c ti no p e nc o u n t r i e s . 13 To the extent that the KKM measure of precision indeed
reﬂects measurement error, we can conclude that the diﬀerences between open and closed
countries reported in columns (2)-(7) are not due to diﬀerences in the extent of attenuation
bias.
It is worth spending some words on the relationship between openness and output. The
eﬀect of openness on output is β2 +β3 ×CORRUPTION + β5CONTINENT. In column
(1), surprisingly, openness has no eﬀect on output at all levels of corruption. On the other
hand, adding continent dummies we typically ﬁnd that openness has a positive eﬀect on
output for countries that are not highly corrupt. For example the coeﬃcients in column (2)
indicate that the eﬀect of openness on output in an African country with zero corruption is
0.55 (statistically diﬀerent from zero at the 6 percent level) and becomes negative only if the
corruption index is above 1.05. Similar results are obtained for the other speciﬁcations and
the remaining continents. In Europe, the threshold level of corruption at which openness
becomes beneﬁcial is the lowest among all continents, at -0.33. This implies that for most
post-communist countries (which have high values of the corruption index) the eﬀect of
openness is negative.
In Table 5 we try several alternative speciﬁcations to assess the robustness of the results.
In column (1) we use data on corruption and openness from the 1970s and 1980s, taken from
Mauro (1995), and as our openness variable we take the 1975 to 1984 average of the Sachs-
Warner dummies. The coeﬃcient on corruption in closed economies is -0.27, with t-statistic
of -1.60, whereas the eﬀect in open economies is -0.56 and highly signiﬁcant (F-statistic equal
to 49.73). Thus, our main conjecture holds also in the 1980s.
In columns (2) to (4) we explore the eﬀects of using the single-year measures of corruption
collected by KKM, rather than the average between 1996 and 2000. The results are in
line with our previous ﬁndings, especially when we use the 1998 or the 2000 measure of
corruption. The 1996 corruption measure yields a marginally signiﬁcant (at the 10 percent
level) relationship between corruption and output in closed countries, but the coeﬃcient is
still roughly one half of that for open countries.
In columns (5) to (8), we test whether our results are robust to the addition of a number
of exogenous control variables (latitude, religion, and size), which are commonly used in
the governance literature.14 The inclusion of these variables has essentially no eﬀect on the
estimated relationship between corruption and output, and on the diﬀerences between open
and closed economies. The only exception occurs when we include the religion variables:
13We obtain the same results if we use countries in the top half of the distribution of the noisiness measure.
14Alesina and Spolaore (2003) argue that size is in fact determined endogenously.
10the relationship between corruption and output in closed economies is signiﬁcant at the 10
percent level, but the size of the eﬀect is still half of that found in open economies.
2.4 Endogeneity
If corruption and output are jointly determined, then one cannot provide a causal interpre-
tation to the OLS estimates of equation (1). Moreover, since corruption is only imperfectly
measured, the OLS estimates suﬀe rf r o ma t t e n u a t i o nb i a sa sw e l la ss i m u l t a n e i t yb i a s .B o t h
biases can be addressed if we have exogenous instruments that are correlated with corruption
but uncorrelated with the error term in equation (1). In Table 6, we address these problems
using several diﬀerent sets of instruments that have been used previously in the literature.
La Porta, et al. (1999) show that the quality of government is strongly related to a
country’s legal origins. Countries with a French or socialist legal system tend to have lower
quality of government, relative to countries with a legal system based on English common
law: hence, these countries tend to have more corruption, less protection of property rights,
a higher regulatory burden, and less eﬃcient provision of essential public goods. La Porta
et al. argue that English common law, which developed as a reaction of Parliament and
property owners to attempts by the sovereign to expropriate them, is more conducive to
good governance; on the other hand, French civil law, which developed as an instrument
of state building and the expansion of the sovereign’s power, tends by its nature to restrict
individuals’ property rights; socialist law is an extreme case of the state creating institutions
that protect the Communist party’s hold on power, without much respect for individual’s
rights and freedoms. In using the legal origin dummies as instruments, we assume that
the only eﬀect of legal origins on present output is through their eﬀect on the quality of
government.
Mauro (1995) and Alesina, Devleeschauwer, Easterly, Kurlat and Wacziarg (2003) argue
that societies that are more ethnically or linguistically fractionalized have more corrupt
governments, as bureaucrats may have larger incentives to steal money to favor members
of their own group. Since the degree of ethnic and linguistic fractionalization is to a large
extent determined by the arbitrary straight-line borders traced by colonial powers in the
past, it seems reasonable to assume that this variable is uncorrelated with the disturbance
in today’s output equation.
Hall and Jones (1999) and KKM instrument social infrastructure using the fraction of the
population who speaks English and other major European languages as a mother tongue.
The underlying idea for these instruments is that countries where the extent of Western
11European inﬂuence was greater were more likely to adopt a social and economic infrastruc-
ture that was favorable for economic development: protection of property rights, a system of
checks and balances in government, and the free-market ideas of Adam Smith. Moreover, fac-
tors that attracted Western European colonizers ﬁve centuries ago (an abundance of natural
resources, sparse population) seem unlikely to be correlated with unobserved determinants
of productivity today.
Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2001) suggest using European settler mortality as an
instrument for current institutions. Their argument is based on the assumption that high
settler mortality in the colonies deterred European settlements and therefore prevented the
establishment of European institutions in those territories. That in turn inﬂuences current
institutions, and thereby current economic performance.
Table 6 presents IV estimates of equation (1). The instrument set is made up of le-
gal origin dummies (column 1), the percentage in the population that speaks English and
the percentage that speaks a major European language (column 2), the degree of ethnic
fractionalization (column 3), the degree of linguistic fractionalization (column 4), and Eu-
ropean settler mortality (column 5); in addition, the interaction of these variables with the
openness dummy is also included in the instrument set, since the endogenous variable, cor-
ruption, enters equation (1) both linearly and interacted with the openness variable. There
is substantial variability in the coeﬃcients on the corruption and the corruption-openness
interaction, but this is probably due to the weak power of the instruments in the closed
countries sample, which leads to highly imprecise estimates.15 In fact, in contrast to the
wide range of estimates in the individual coeﬃcients, the implied eﬀe c to fc o r r u p t i o no nl o g
GDP in open economies (i.e., the sum of the two coeﬃcients) ranges from −0.797 to −1.842,
ar e s u l ti nl i n ew i t ht h eO L Se s t i m a t e so fT a b l e4 .I na l lﬁve cases, the F test for the hy-
pothesis that the sum of the coeﬃcients is equal to zero is soundly rejected. By contrast, in
four of the ﬁve speciﬁcations, we cannot reject the null hypothesis of no correlation between
corruption and output in closed countries.
It can be argued that openness should also be treated as an endogenous variable. Coun-
tries that adopt more free-market trade policies may also adopt free-market domestic policies
and stable ﬁscal and monetary policies, which could potentially increase their output per
15The ﬁrst stage F statistic is large in the ﬁrst two speciﬁcations, somewhat smaller in the third and
ﬁfth speciﬁcations, and in column (4) it barely exceeds conventional signiﬁcance values and is substantially
smaller than the “rule of thumb” value of 10, which casts some doubt on the validity of the estimates. In
the ﬁrst two columns, where the equation is overidentiﬁed, the Hansen test does not reject the null of the
validity of the instruments.
12capita. To address this issue, we use as instrument for openness Frankel and Romer’s (1999)
log of the predicted trade share (imports plus exports as a fraction of GDP) obtained from
a gravity model of bilateral trade. The gravity model isolates the component of trade that
is due to purely geographic variables, such as distance to other trading partners, size, and
whether the country is landlocked. Our variable is taken from Dollar and Kraay (2003), who
use data from the 1990s to update Frankel and Romer’s original instrument. The straight-
forward approach would have been to instrument for openness every time it appears in the
regression equation. This would have resulted in a cumbersome speciﬁcation with a very
large number of instruments. To avoid this, we estimated the model separately for Africa,
Asia/Oceania, and Europe.16 The instrument set is composed by the legal origin dummies
(which had the strongest ﬁrst stage F-statistic in Table 6), the Frankel-Romer instrument,
and all possible interactions between the two. The results are presented in Table 7. In
Asia/Oceania and Europe the results are in line with all our previous ﬁndings, while in
Africa corruption is uncorrelated with output in both open and closed countries. However,
the ﬁrst stage F statistics are fairly small, casting some doubts on the reliability of these
estimates. Using the other instruments for corruption revealed the same pattern of results.
Altogether, the IV results conﬁrm the ﬁn d i n g so fT a b l e s4a n d5 . I no p e ne c o n o m i e s ,
corruption is strongly negatively correlated to output, whereas, in closed economies, in most
speciﬁcations we ﬁnd no such relationship.
3 Interpreting the Results
Why is it then that the negative eﬀect of corruption on output per capita is restricted to
open countries alone? To shed further light on this issue, we now delve deeper into the
interactions between corruption, openness, and output. In particular, we ﬁrst decompose
income to gauge whether our pattern of results is attributable to physical capital, to human
capital, or to total factor productivity. We then investigate which particular aspects of
openness appears to aﬀect the relationship between corruption and output.
3.1 The Components of Output
The common view among economists is that corruption aﬀects output by distorting the al-
location of resources. This view contrasts with the hypothesis, which is prevalent among
16In North and South America there are not enough closed countries to carry out this analysis.
13economic historians and political scientists, that in an economy that has a rigid bureau-
cracy, corruption may be beneﬁcial as a way of ‘oiling the wheels of bureaucracy.’ The
decomposition of output into its components, capital (physical and human) and total factor
productivity (TFP) oﬀers a glimpse into this controversy. We follow Hall and Jones (1999)
in taking the view that TFP mainly reﬂects market eﬃciency.
We assume that each country has a Cobb-Douglas production function with physical and









where K and L are capital and labor, E is average years of schooling, the function ψ(·)
describes the eﬀects of schooling on labor productivity, and A is the productivity term.
Dividing both sides of the equation by L and taking logs yields the standard textbook
decomposition of output per worker into a part due to the capital-labor ratio, a part due to
human capital, and a part due to total factor productivity:
ln(Yi/Li)=αln(Ki/Li)+( 1− α)ψ(Ei)+l nAi. (2)
We set α =1 /3, and follow Hall and Jones by letting ψ(·) be a piecewise linear function with
coeﬃcients derived from microeconomic evidence.17 To measure E,w eu s ea v e r a g ey e a r so f
schooling of the population aged 25 and over in 1995, taken from the Barro-Lee (2000) data
set. Since this variable is available in only 104 countries (and is not available in all the newly
created countries of Central Europe and the former Soviet Union), we impute the missing
schooling data using data on literacy rates and enrollment in school taken from the World
Bank (2001). Finally, we calculate each country’s capital stock in 2000 using a perpetual
inventory method and data on investments dating back to as early as 1960 from the Penn
World Tables, mark 6.1 (Heston, Summers and Aten 2002).18 T h e s ec o m p o n e n t sa l l o wu st o
obtain lnA as the residual in equation (2).
17Hall and Jones (1999) base their estimates on a rich survey by Psacharopoulos (1994) on returns to
schooling estimates across the world. As in Hall and Jones, we assume that the rate of return for the ﬁrst
four years of education is 13.4 percent. For the next four years, we assume a value of 10.1 percent. Finally,
for education beyond the eighth year, we assume a value of 6.8 percent, which is the average rate of return
in OECD countries as reported by Psacharopoulos.
18We take countries with investment data going back at least to 1980. The initial value of the capital stock
is imputed to be equal to the value of investment in the ﬁrst available year, divided by (g + δ),w h e r eg is
calculated as the average geometricg r o w t hr a t eo fi n v e s t m e n ti nt h eﬁrst ten years, and δ is the depreciation
rate, which we assume to be equal to 6 percent.
For the Czech and Slovak republics, the capital stock was calculated as follows. We took Czechoslovakia’s
capital stock in the last available year (1990, in the Penn World Tables, mark 5.6), and assigned to the Czech
14In Table 8 we present regressions similar to those of Table 4, where the dependent vari-
ables are the three separate components of output per worker. Data on the individual
components of output, on corruption and on openness are available for 126 countries. In
the ﬁrst three columns we report results for the whole sample. A striking result is that
corruption is unrelated to physical capital in closed countries (in fact the coeﬃcient is posi-
tive), while the correlation is strong and negative in open countries, mirroring the ﬁndings of
Table 4. The same pattern appears when human capital is the dependent variable, although
the magnitude of the coeﬃcients is diminished. In contrast to these results, corruption has
an e g a t i v ee ﬀect on total factor productivity, regardless of whether the economy is open
or closed. The same pattern of results emerges when restricting attention to the subset of
highly corrupt countries (columns 4 through 6).
Altogether, the results in Table 8 suggest that reduced capital accumulation is the main
channel through which the diﬀerence in the eﬀect of corruption on output between open and
closed economies can be explained. Although our ﬁndings are not inconsistent with the view
that corruption does harm the economy through the distortion of resource allocation, they
do point to an additional, important, channel through which corruption adversely aﬀects the
economy.
3.2 What Type of Openness Matters?
A plausible explanation to our ﬁndings may be that corruption somehow distorts trade
relationships. If that is the case then the larger the share of trade in output, the greater
is the damage that corruption causes, and closed countries who trade the least are less
susceptible to its eﬀects.
We test this hypothesis in columns (1) through (4) of Table 9. We replicate the regression
and Slovak republics the capital stock so that the ratio of the initial capital stock is the same as the ratio of





For the former republics of the Soviet Union, the capital stock was calculated as follows. We calculated
the capital stock in Russia in 1991 following the same procedure used for Czech and Slovak republics, using
the USSR’s capital stock and GDP in 1989 as the base. With this value in hand, we imputed the capital
stock for Russia up to the year 2000 using the perpetual inventory method. For the remaining countries of
the former Soviet Union, we calculated the capital stock in the ﬁrst available year of data assuming that the
capital to GDP ratio in that year equalled that of Russia in the same year, and updated that series using
the perpetual inventory method.
15in column (2) of Table 4, using diﬀerent measures of openness. In column (1) we classify
c o u n t r i e sa so p e ni ft h e i rs h a r eo fi m p o r t sp l u se x p o r t so v e rG D Pi n1 9 9 5( t a k e nf r o mD o l l a r
and Kraay, 2003) is above the median, and closed otherwise, while in column (2) we use
this share as a continuous measure of openness. In column (3) openness is a binary variable
taking the value of 1 if the level of tariﬀs is below 20 percent, and in column (4) openness is
equal to one minus the average tariﬀ.19 Interestingly, in all four speciﬁcations we ﬁnd a strong
negative relationship between corruption and output in both closed and open economies. If
anything, the negative relationship is stronger if the economy is closed.
Next, we explore whether the diﬀerence in the eﬀect of corruption on output between open
and closed economies is due to a country’s degree of ﬁnancial openness using the black market
premium as our measure of ﬁnancial openness. The black market premium is in practice the
eﬀective tax that must be paid in order to circumvent restrictions on the movement of capital,
and can be viewed as a measure of the ease with which one can move money in and out of the
economy. Therefore, countries with a high black market premium can be considered, for all
practical purposes, to be ﬁnancially closed. Data on the black market premium is taken from
Wacziarg and Welch (2003) and is available for 137 countries: it represents the average black
market premium over the 1990-1999 period. In column (5) of Table 9 we classify countries
dichotomously as open or closed based on whether the black market premium is below or
above 20 percent. The results are quite similar to those found using the overall openness
measure: in ﬁnancially closed countries we ﬁnd no signiﬁcant relationship, and in ﬁnancially
open countries we ﬁnd a strong negative relationship between corruption and output. In
column (6) we use 1 minus the black market premium as our measure of ﬁnancial openness:
this variable runs from zero (countries with a black market premium above 100 percent)
to one (countries where the black market premium is equal to zero). The results resemble
quite closely those in column (5): the coeﬃcient on corruption, representing the eﬀect of
corruption on output in a completely closed economy, is statistically indistinguishable from
zero. The interaction term is negative and imprecisely estimated. However, the sum of
the coeﬃcients, which represents the eﬀect of corruption on output in an economy with a
black market premium of zero is highly signiﬁcant. In other words, the higher the degree of
ﬁnancial openness, the stronger the negative correlation between corruption and output.
The evidence in Table 9 suggests that the eﬀect of corruption is more closely related to
ﬁnancial openness than to trade openness.
19We use the average level of unweighted tariﬀs between 1990 and 1999, taken from Wacziarg and Welch
(2003).
16Finally, we should mention that we make no attempt to use direct measures of capital
ﬂight and to study their relationship with corruption and openness.20 The reason for this is
that in an open economy, illegally obtained funds can be legally transferred abroad. Oﬃcials
who amass funds through corruption, can export them legally, without such tranfers being
recorded as capital ﬂight. Hence, the relationship between corruption and capital ﬂight is
less pronounced in open than in closed economies. For that reason we prefer in our context
to use the term “capital drain” which encompasses both legal and illegal transfers of capital.
4 Capital Drain
In this section we present a model for the relationship between corruption, openness, and
output that is consistent with the three basic stylized facts that we have described above:
(1) corruption is negatively correlated with output in open economies, but not in closed
economies; (2) the diﬀerence between closed and open economies is mainly due to the diﬀerent
eﬀect of corruption on capital accumulation in closed and open economies, respectively; and
(3) the extent to which corruption aﬀects output is determined primarily by the degree of
ﬁnancial openness.
T h ee x p l a n a t i o nw ep r o v i d ef o rt h e s et h r e eo b s e r v a t i o n si ss i m p l e . C o r r u p to ﬃcials
wish to hide the proceeds of their illegal activities as far as possible from the reach of
law enforcement authorities in their own country. Therefore, to the extent they can do
this, corrupt oﬃcials prefer to smuggle the money they steal outside of the country. The
advantage of doing so is that if they are caught, then the authorities would not be able to
retrieve the stolen money. Smuggling illegally obtained capital outside the country has the
additional advantage of making consumption less conspicuous, which reduces the likelihood
of getting caught. On the other hand, conventional wisdom suggests that investors strongly
prefer to invest in their home country, where they have better information on investment
opportunities (French and Poterba, 1991). The extent to which illegal money will be diverted
abroad depends on the cost of transferring it. In an open economy, the cost of smuggling
capital outside the economy is low, and the net return on overseas investment is high. Thus,
ceteris paribus, in an open economy, more resources would be diverted abroad, depleting
the economy’s stock of capital, and reducing output. In contrast, in a ﬁnancially closed
economy, it is more expensive to divert capital abroad, and so the damage to the economy
may be signiﬁcantly smaller. This explanation suggests that capital drain can potentially
20See Boyce and Ndikumana (2001) for a recent estimate of capital ﬂight in Sub-Saharan Africa.
17be an important channel through which corruption aﬀects output.21
4.1 Model
Our model extends the standard Solow model to include corruption and capital drain. Con-









where t ≥ 1 indicates period. The government taxes output and uses the proceeds to produce
the common factor of productivity, At. However, corrupt bureaucrats steal part of the tax
revenues which implies that less can be used to pay for the production of At. Letting τt
denote the tax rate, ct the total amount of resources stolen by bureaucrats, s the saving rate
and 1 − φ the proportion of stolen resources that are diverted abroad, At+1 and Kt+1 are
given by the following equations
At+1 =( τtYt − ct)
β β>0 (4)
Kt+1 =( 1 − τt)sYt + sφct 0 ≤ φ ≤ 1. (5)
Namely, in every period the government uses the collected taxes less the amount stolen,
τtYt − ct, to produce the next period’s common factor of productivity, At+1; and the next
period’s amount of productive capital, Kt+1, is equal to the amount of after-tax savings,
(1−τt)sYt, plus the amount of stolen resources that are reinvested in the economy, sφct.W e
assume that the rest of the stolen resources are either smuggled outside of the economy, or
consumed with the same proportion, s, in which legal output is consumed.
To ensure that total return to capital in both the private and public sectors is decreasing,
we require that the two parameters α and β be such that
α + β<1.
Every period, a measure one of bureaucrats or state oﬃcials each choose an amount ct of
resources to steal that would maximize their expected utilities:
(1 − π(ct))u(wt + ct) (6)
subject to the constraint
ct ≤ τtYt. (7)
21Indeed, Pastor (1990) ﬁnds that exchange controls reduce the extent of capital ﬂight.
18The function u(·) denotes the state oﬃcials’ utility function; π(ct) denotes the probability
of getting caught as a function of the amount of resources stolen, ct; and wt denotes the
state oﬃcials’ wage. The utility function u(·) is assumed to be non negative, increasing, and
concave. State oﬃcials’ utility when they are caught is normalized to zero. The probability
of getting caught π(·) is assumed to be increasing, diﬀerentiable, and convex on the interval
[0,c] for some c<∞, to be equal to one for all c ≥ c, to be equal to zero at zero, and to
have a derivative of zero at zero. We assume that oﬃcials can only steal from the taxes
they themselves have collected, which implies that ct ≤ τtYt. Because all state oﬃcials are
identical, they each steal the same amount ct. The fact that there is a measure one of state
oﬃc i a l si m p l i e st h a tct is also the total amount of resources stolen in the economy, and that
each state oﬃcial is responsible for the collection of τtYt of tax revenues at t.
For simplicity, we assume that the oﬃcials’ wage rate in every period is proportional to
income, that is, wt = γYt for some ﬁxed γ>0. We refer to the amount stolen in period t,
ct, as the level of corruption in the economy in period t.
In every period the government, who anticipates the amount stolen by its oﬃcials, sets
the tax rate τt to maximize the discounted value of future output.
Finally, for simplicity, we assume that eψ(Et)Lt =1for all t ≥ 1.
4.2 Equilibrium
Deﬁnition. A sequence {(Yt,A t,τt,c t)}t≥1 is a competitive equilibrium of the economy if
it satisﬁes equations (3)-(5), and is such that for every t ≥ 1, ct is chosen optimally by state
oﬃcials given Yt and τt, and τt is chosen optimally by the government given Yt and ct.
Fix some period t. For every level of Yt and τt, denote the state oﬃcials’ optimal choice
of corruption by c(Yt,τt). As shown by Lemma 1 below, the amount of resources stolen in
every period, decreases as the economy becomes richer.22
Lemma 1. There exists a level of resources Y > 0 such that in every period t ≥ 1, for
every Yt ≤ Y , the state oﬃcials’ optimal choice of corruption is given by c(Yt,τt)=τtYt for
every τt ∈ [0,1]. For Yt >Y,c(Yt,τt) declines continuously in Yt and is independent of the
tax rate τt except in case where the tax rate is so low that state oﬃcials would want to set
22This is consistent with the empirical ﬁndings of Van Rijckeghem and Weder (2001) who show that
corruption is decreasing in the wage paid to state employees (which, in our model, is assumed to be increasing
in Yt).
19ct >τ tYt if they could. In this case, because ct is constrained to be smaller than or equal to
τtYt,c(Yt,τt)=τtYt.
The reason that corruption declines with output is simple. Higher wages reduce the mar-
ginal utility from corruption, and therefore, weaken the incentive of government bureaucrats
to steal. Hence, our assumption that state oﬃcials’ wages are proportional to output implies
that bureaucratic corruption is lower in richer countries. In very poor economies, that is
when Y ≤ Y , the marginal utility from corruption is so high and tax revenues are so low
that all tax revenues are stolen.
As mentioned above, in every period, the government, who anticipates the level of cor-
ruption, determines the tax rate τt so as to maximize the discounted present value of output.
Lemma 2. In equilibrium, if Yt >Y and the government expects the level of corruption to











if Yt ≤ Y , then the government is indiﬀerent among all tax rates τt ∈ [0,1].
Lemma 2 implies that greater corruption leads to higher tax rates. This is because the
government anticipates the loss of revenues caused by corruption and reacts to it by raising
the tax rate. However, if the economy is so poor that all the tax revenues will anyway be
stolen, then the tax rate becomes immaterial.
Three remarks are in order. First, if Yt >Y, then the government sets the tax rate τt in
such a way that ct <τ tYt.
Second, by construction, taxes in our model are not distortionary. If they were, as they
usually are in practice, then corruption would have caused an additional harm by inducing
higher tax rates.
Third, whenever, Yt >Y, corruption aﬀects output only through its eﬀect on the level
of capital drain. In the extreme case in which the economy is completely closed and φ =1 ,
the level of corruption has no eﬀect on equilibrium at all. To see this, suppose that if there
was no corruption (c =0 ) , then by Lemma 2 the government would have set the tax rate
optimally at τ∗ =
β
α+β, with the resulting levels of A∗ =( τ∗Y )
β and K∗ =( 1− τ∗)Y. If
φ =1 , then given any corruption level c, setting τ = τ∗ + c/Y generates the same values of
A∗ and K∗, as in the economy without corruption.
In equilibrium, the state of the economy at date t is completely determined by the value
of Yt. In order to study the dynamics of the economy, it is convenient to express Yt+1 in
20terms of Yt. Equations (3)-(5), imply that Yt+1 = fφ (Yt) where fφ (·) is given by:
fφ (Yt)=( τtYt − ct)
β ((1 − τt)sYt + φsct)
α (9)
where ct = c(Yt,τt) and τt is given by (8). The following lemma describes the properties of
fφ (Yt).
Lemma 3. The function fφ (·) has the following properties:
1. fφ (·) is continuous;
2. For Y ∈ [0,Y],f φ (Y )=0 ;fφ (·) is strictly increasing on [Y ,∞);
3. fφ (Y ) tends to inﬁnity with Y ;
4. The derivative of fφ (Y ) tends to zero as Y tends to inﬁnity.
The properties of fφ(·) imply that, generically, there are two possibilities. Either the entire
graph of fφ lies below the 450 line, in which case there is a unique steady-state equilibrium
at Y =0 ;o rfφ crosses the 450 line at least twice in which case there are at least two stable
steady-states, one at zero and the other at some Y ∗ > 0 as illustrated in Figure 2.
In this case, the equilibrium to which the economy converges depends on the initial level
of output. If Y>ˆ Y , then the economy converges to a steady state with high output and low
corruption, and if Y<ˆ Y , then the economy converges to a steady state with zero output
and high corruption.
Note that fφ (·) increases and Y declines as the probability of getting caught, π, increases.
In the extreme case where π(0) = 1, t h e r ei sn oc o r r u p t i o na n dt h em o d e lb e c o m e sv e r y
s i m i l a rt oas t a n d a r dg r o w t hm o d e l . N o t ea l s ot h a tfφ (·) is increasing and therefore Y
declines in φ. This is due to the fact that capital drain declines with φ (again, for simplicity,
we focus our attention only on the negative eﬀects of openness in facilitating capital drain
while ignoring its beneﬁts). Consequently, in a more open economy, the threshold level of
w e a l t ha b o v ew h i c ht h e r ei sc o n v e r g e n c et ot h eg o o ds t e a d ys t a t ei sh i g h e r ,w h i c hi m p l i e st h a t
it is more likely that the economy would be trapped in a vicious cycle with high corruption
and low wealth.
215C o n c l u s i o n s
Many agree that corruption and poverty feed on each other to create a vicious cycle: high cor-
ruption leads to poverty, which generates yet more corruption, and so on. Bardhan (1997) for
example states “it is probably correct to say that the process of economic growth ultimately
generates enough forces to reduce corruption” (p. 1329). But, as Williams (2000) cautions,
b e c a u s e“ t h e‘ t a k eo ﬀ’ phase of economic growth seen as necessary for [...] development had
not materialized. [...] It is no longer legitimate to assume that development would resolve
the multiple problems besetting the South" (p. ix). This pessimistic observation is at odds
with the fact that many of today’s developed economies experienced widespread corruption
during their history, and yet have managed to break out of the vicious circle to become rich
and non corrupt. Theobald (1990), for example, describes the widespread corruption of state
legislatures and city governments during the “gilded age” of 1860s and 1870s in the U.S. (see
also Josephson, 1934, and Callow, 1966). In England, corruption was so severe at times that
Wraith and Simkins (1963) write “The settlements of 1660 and 1688 inaugurated the Age
of Reason, and substituted a system of patronage, bribery, and corruption for the previous
method of bloodletting” (p. 60). Indeed, Bardhan (1997, p. 1328) notes that “historians
[...] point to many cases when a great deal of corruption in dispensing licenses, or loans,
or mine and land concessions has been associated with (and may have even helped in) the
emergence of an entrepreneurial class.”
What is it that makes present corruption so much more harmful to development than
past corruption? Why is corruption said to stall development in many of today’s developing
economies, but not in the developing economies of one or more centuries ago?
Our answer to this puzzle is that one or two centuries ago, illegally obtained capital re-
mained and was invested in one’s home country: a late 19th century public oﬃcial implicated
with corruption in New York could safely enjoy the proceeds of his graft in Minneapolis or in
San Francisco. Thus, there was no need to smuggle illegally obtained resources outside the
economy and the gains from corruption became part of the economy’s productive capital.
In contrast, today it is harder for public oﬃcials, even in third world countries, to hide the
proceeds of their illegal activities within their own country, and therefore, a larger proportion
of stolen money is smuggled abroad.
This insight may also help explain the otherwise puzzling ﬂow of capital from poor to
rich countries (Lucas, 1990), which conﬂicts with the predictions of conventional neoclassical
growth theories according to which capital should ﬂow from rich economies where the return
to capital is relatively low to poor economies where the return to capital is relatively high.
22Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1. Inspection of the necessary and suﬃcient ﬁrst-order condition of
state oﬃcials’ optimization problem reveals that c(Yt,τt) is implicitly given by the unique
solution, ct, of the following equation,
(1 − π(ct))u
0(γYt + ct)=u(γYt + ct)π
0 (ct), (10)
provided it exists, or by τtYt, whichever is smaller. The properties of u(·) and π(·) imply
that c(Yt,τt) is continuous and nonincreasing in Yt, and nondecreasing in τt. The value Y
is given by the solution to the equation ct (Y,1) = Y. As Yt tends to inﬁnity, c(Yt,τt) tends
to zero; and c(Yt,τt)=τtYt for all suﬃciently small values of Yt and τt. By (10), c(Yt,τt) is
independent of τt e x c e p ti nc a s ew h e r eτt is so small that state oﬃcials would want to set
ct >τ tYt if they could. In this case, because ct is constrained to be smaller than or equal to
τtYt,c(Yt,τt)=τtYt.
P r o o fo fL e m m a2 .The size of the tax rate τt has a direct eﬀect on future output only
through its eﬀect on Yt+1. As will become clear below when we specify the dynamics of the
model, Yt+2 is positively related to Yt+1. Similarly, Yt+3, in turn, is positively related to Yt+2
and so on. Therefore, choosing the tax rate τt to maximize Yt would also maximize the
discounted present value of output, regardless of which discount rate is chosen.
The government’s objective in every period t may thus be limited to choosing the tax
rate τt ≤ 1 that maximizes the level of output Yt in period t, which, by (3)-(5) is given by
Yt+1 =( τtYt − c(Yt,τt))
β ((1 − τt)sYt + sφc(Yt,τt))
α . (11)
Obviously, if it is at all possible, or whenever Yt is suﬃciently large, the government would
set τt > ct
Yt. In this case,
∂c(Yt,τt)
∂τt =0 , and so diﬀerentiation of (11) with respect to τt and
equating the derivative with zero yields (8). The second order condition for optimization is
satisﬁed in this solution. When Yt is not suﬃciently large, c(Yt,τt)=τtYt for every τt ≤ 1
and so every τt ∈ [0,1] is optimal.
fφ (Yt)=( τtYt − ct)
β ((1 − τt)sYt + φsct)
α (12)
Proof of Lemma 3. (1) Continuity is a consequence of the continuity of c(Yt,τt) and
τ (Yt,c t).
23(2) By Lemma 1, for Y ≤ Y ,c(Y,τ)=τY for every tax rate τ ≤ 1, from which it follows
that fφ (Y )=0 . To see that fφ is increasing for Y> Y ,n o t et h a ti fc declines from c1 to c2,
then the government can increase output from Y1 to Y2 by choosing τ2 = τ1 +
c1−c2
Y ,
Y2 =( τ2Yt − c2)
β ((1 − τ2)sYt + φsc2)
α
=( τ1Yt − c1)
β ((1 − τ1)sYt + φsc1 +( 1− φ)(c1 − c2))
α
>Y 1.
For Y> Y ,b yL e m m a1 ,c declines with Y and is unaﬀected by τ. Hence, an increase by Y
reduces c in which case there exist τ for which output increases.
( 3 )F o l l o w sf r o mt h ef a c tt h a tc(Y,τ) is nonincreasing in Y and independent of the value
of τ when Y is large, and the fact that τ (Yt,c(Yt)) is decreasing in Yt. Finally,
(4) f0 (Yt) is bounded from above by sY
β
t (Yt +φct)α which has a derivative that tends to
zero as Yt tends to inﬁnity.
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GDP per capita in current US $, at purchasing power parity  World Development Indicators 




An aggregate of several indicators, collected by international 
organizations, political and business risk rating agencies, think 
tanks and non-governmental organizations, measuring “the 
exercise of public power for private gain.” The index is 
standardized to have mean 0 and standard deviation 1. 
 






An index for “the degree to which business transactions 
involve corruption or questionable payments,” collected by 
Business International, a private firm, during the period 1980-
1983. The raw index is standardized to have mean 0 and 
standard deviation 1. 
 
Mauro (1995)  68 countries 
Wacziarg-Welch openness 
dummy, 1990-1999 
A country is defined as open if all the following criteria are 
met: 1) the average of unweighted tariffs in the 1990-1999 
period is lower than 40%; 2) the average of core non-tariff 
barriers on capital goods and intermediates is lower than 40%; 
3) the average black market premium over the period is lower 
than 20%; 4) the country does not have an export marketing 
board; 5) the country is not socialist. 
 
Wacziarg and Welch (2003)  141 countries  













A country is defined as open in any given year if it meets all the 
following criteria: 1) the average of unweighted tariffs is lower 
than 40%; 2) the average of core non-tariff barriers on capital 
goods and intermediates is lower than 40%; 3) the black market 
premium is lower than 20%; 4) it does not have an export 
marketing board; 5) it is not socialist. 
 
Sachs and Warner (1995)  110 countries 
Legal origins 
 
Dummies for whether the origin of the country’s legal system is 
British (common law), French (civil law), German/Scandinavian 
(civil law) or socialist. 
 
La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, 





Percentage of the population who speaks English as their 
“mother tongue”. 
Alesina et al. (2002)  217 countries 
Percentage European 
language speakers 
Percentage of the population who speaks a major European 
language (English, French, German, Spanish, Portuguese) as 
their “mother tongue”. 
 
Alesina et al. (2002)  217 countries 
Ethnic  
fractionalization 
A variable measuring the probability that two randomly selected 
individuals in the population belong to different ethnic groups. 
Calculated as one minus the Herfindahl index of ethnic group 
shares. 
Alesina et al. (2002)  190 countries 
Log settler mortality  Log of mortality rates of soldiers, bishops and sailors stationed 
in the colonies between the 17
th and the 19
th centuries. 
Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson 
(2001) 
64 countries  













A variable measuring the probability that two randomly selected 
individuals in the population speak the same “mother tongue”. 
Calculated as one minus the Herfindahl index of language 
shares. 
Alesina et al. (2002)  202 countries 
Capital per worker:  
ln (K/L) 
Capital stock per worker in 2000, in constant 1995 international 
dollars. Imputed using a perpetual inventory method using all 
available investment data 
Penn World Tables, mark 6.1  134 countries 
Human capital: 
φ(E) 
Human capital index based on a piecewise linear function of 
total years of schooling of population aged 25 and over in 1995.  
Barro and Lee (2000)  175 countries 
Productivity: 
ln A 
Total factor productivity, calculated from the decomposition of 
output: 
() ( ) ( ) ( ) A E L K L Y ln 1 / ln / ln + − + = φ α α  
Penn World Tables, mark 6.1 and 




(Exports + Imports)/(GDP at PPP) in 1995, at constant 1985 $.  Dollar and Kraay (2002)  144 countries 
Tariffs 
 
Average of unweighted tariffs in 1990-1999 period. Wacziarg  and  Welch  (2002)  121  countries 
Black market premium 
 
Average black market premium in 1990-1999 period.  Wacziarg and Welch (2002)  137 countries 
Surface area (in square 
kilometers) 
Surface area (in square kilometers) World  Development  Indicators, 
2001 
196 countries 
Population  Population in 1998  World Bank Development Index, 
2001 
194 countries  
Table 2: List of Countries by Openness Status and Degree of Corruption 
 















Total: 1 countries 
Bangladesh, Belarus, China, Croatia, Ethiopia, 






Total: 12 countries 
Algeria, Angola, Burundi, Central African 
Republic, Chad, Congo, Congo Democratic 
Republic (Zaire), Gabon, Haiti, Iran, Kazakhstan, 
Malawi, Nigeria, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, 
Russia, Sierra Leone, Syria, Tanzania, Togo, 
Turkmenistan, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Zambia. 
 
Total: 24 countries 
 
Open 
Australia, Austria, Belgium, Botswana, Canada, 
Chile, Costa Rica, Cyprus, Czech Republic, 
Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, 
Hong Kong, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, 
Italy, Japan, South Korea, Luxembourg, Malaysia, 
Malta, Mauritius, Netherlands, New Zealand, 
Norway, Poland, Portugal, Singapore, Slovak 
Republic, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, 
Switzerland, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, 
United Kingdom, United States, Uruguay. 
 
 
Total: 43 countries 
 
Albania, Argentina, Benin, Brazil, Bulgaria, 
Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Colombia, Cote 
d’Ivoire, Dominican Republic, Egypt, El 
Salvador, The Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Jamaica, 
Jordan, Latvia, Lesotho, Lithuania, Madagascar, 
Mali, Mauritania, Mexico, Morocco, Panama, 
Peru, Philippines, Sri Lanka, Swaziland, Thailand, 
Turkey, Yemen. 
 
Total: 33 countries 
Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bolivia, Cameroon, 
Ecuador, Georgia, Guatemala, Guinea-Bissau, 
Honduras, Indonesia, Kenya, Kyrgyzstan, FYR 
Macedonia, Moldova, Mozambique, Nicaragua, 





Total: 21 countries 
Notes: Countries are defined to have low, medium, or high corruption based on the Kaufmann et al. (2003) graft index. Countries in the bottom third of the corruption 
distribution are defined as low corruption, countries in the middle third are defined as medium corruption, and countries in the top third are defined as high corruption. The 
openness dummy is taken from Wacziarg and Welch (2003).  
Table 3: Summary Statistics 
 N  Mean  Standard  Deviation  Minimum  Maximum 
Log GDP per capita, 1996-2003  134  8.384  1.173  6.186  10.729 
Corruption, 1996-2000  134  -0.057  1.014  -2.39  1.61 
Corruption,    1982  62  0.004 0.999 -1.254 2.264 
Wacziarg-Welch openness dummy, 1990-1999 134 0.724  0.449  0  1 
Legal origin – English  134  0.261  0.441  0  1 
Legal origin – French  134  0.470  0.501  0  1 
Legal origin – socialist  134  0.194  0.397  0  1 
Legal origin – other  134  0.075  0.264  0  1 
Fraction English speakers  134  0.064  0.226  0  0.984 
Fraction European language speakers  134  0.256  0.406  0  1 
Ethnic  fractionalization  133  0.442 0.259 0.002 0.930 
Linguistic  fractionalization  130  0.398 0.294 0.002 0.923 
Log  settler  mortality  61  4.648 1.282 2.146 7.986 
Log  (K/L)  126  9.883 1.543 6.302  12.311 
ψ(E) (Human Capital)  134  0.696 0.309 0.092 1.224 
Log(A)  126  5.575 0.548 4.058 6.788 
Trade  Volume  [(IM+EX)/GDP]  127  0.433 0.425 0.037 2.876 
Average unweighted tariff  118  15.073  9.392  0.32  54.73 
Black market premium  130  418.013 
(Median = 5.25)  4470.29 -0.35 50,979.7 
Latitude  134  0.308  0.200 0 0.722 
Percentage Catholic  134  34.095  36.668  0  97.3 
Percentage Protestant  134  12.417  21.063  0  97.8 
Percentage Muslim  134  20.583  33.082  0  99.5 
Log area (square miles)  132  12.234  1.857  5.768  16.655 
Log  population  134  16.179 1.512 12.521  20.938 
Note: The full sample of 134 countries includes all countries with non-missing data on GDP per capita, corruption and openness in the 1990s based on the Wacziarg-Welch indicator.   
Table 4: Corruption, Openness and Output  
Basic OLS Results  
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Sample  Full Sample  Full Sample  Africa
  Asia/Oceania Europe  Excluding 
OECD 
Corruption 

































































No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
F test for  


















N  134  134  42 27 41  104  85 47 
R
2  0.691 0.826 0.504 0.766 0.839 0.715 0.606 0.795 
 
Notes: The dependent variable is the log of average GDP per capita between 1996and 2003. Robust t-statistics in parentheses.  
Table 5: Robustness Checks 
 



















































































- - - -  2.288 






× Openness  
 
- - - -  -2.145 





F test for  


















N  57  125 134 134 134  133  134  132 
R
2  0.733 0.797 0.818 0.827 0.835  0.844  0.830  0.826 
Notes: The dependent variable is the log of average GDP per capita between 1995 and 1999. Robust t-statistics in parentheses. 
*: In column (6), the coefficients on the religion variables are: fraction catholics 0.749 (0.584); fraction protestants 0.210 (0.336); fraction Muslim 0.621 (0.411); fraction 
catholic × openness –0.611 (0.610); fraction protestant × openness –0.670 (0.418); fraction Muslim × openness –1.009 (0.487). Table 6: Instrumenting for Corruption 
 





































F test for  












N  134 134 133 130  61 
Instrument type  Legal origin  Languages  Ethnic fractionalization  Linguistic 
fractionalization  Log settler mortality 
First Stage F- test: 
Corruption  36.65 8.35  7.83  2.63 12.20 
First Stage F- test: 






(0.13)  - - - 
Notes: The dependent variable is the log of average GDP per capita between 1996 and 2003. Robust t-statistics in parentheses. All regressions include continent dummies and their interaction with the openness 
variable. The instrument set includes the set of exogenous variables, and these variables interacted with the openness dummy.   
Table 7: Instrumenting for Corruption and Openness  
 
  (1) (2) (3) 

























F test for  








N  42 27 41 
First Stage F- test: Corruption  1.68  1.82  20.41 
First Stage F- test: Openness  1.36  1.25  1.23 
First Stage F- test: 









Notes: The dependent variable is the log of average GDP per capita between 1996 and 2003. Robust t-statistics in parentheses. The instrument set includes three legal origin dummies, the Frankel-Romer index, and 
their interactions. 
* :  In Africa there are only two types of legal origins, English and French. Therefore, the instrument set includes only one legal origin dummy, and the model is exactly identified. 
Table 8: Corruption and the Decomposition of Output into its Components 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4)    (5) (6) 
Sample  Full Sample  Full Sample  Full Sample 
Corruption  
Index > 0 
Corruption  
Index > 0 
Corruption  
Index > 0 


































































0.807 0.712 0.591 0.696 0.647 0.388 
Notes: The dependent variable is specified at the top of each column. All regressions include continent dummies, and their interaction with the openness variable. Robust t-statistics in parentheses. For explanations on 
the construction of the dependent variables, see text.  
Table 9: Corruption, Financial Openness and Trade Openness 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4)    (5) (6) 
Sample  Full Sample  Full Sample  Full Sample  Full Sample  Full Sample  Full Sample 
Openness  
Measure 
Open if trade  
volume ≥ median 
Trade volume, 
continuous 
Open if average  
tariff ≤ 20% 
Average tariff, 






























































N  127 127 118 118 130 130 
R
2  0.844 0.863 0.852 0.846 0.823 0.820 
Notes: The dependent variable is the log of average GDP per capita between 1996 and 2003. All regressions include continent dummies, and their interaction with the openness variable. Robust 
t-statistics in parenthesis.  
 
 
 
 